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Abstract — Critical embedded systems need a dependable operating system and 
application. Despite all efforts to prevent and remove faults in system 
development, residual software faults usually persist. Therefore, critical systems 
need some sort of fault tolerance to deal with these faults and also with hardware 
faults at operation time. 
This work proposes fault-tolerant support mechanisms for the BOSS embedded 
operating system, based on the application of proven fault tolerance strategies by 
middleware control software which transparently delivers the added functionality 
to the application software. Special attention is taken to complexity control and 
resource constraints, targeting the needs of the embedded market.  
 
1 Introduction 
Real-time operating systems must provide support to applications in order to satisfy 
the time requirements they are subjected to. Furthermore, both the operating system 
and the application itself need to be dependable. Dependability involves several 
attributes[1] like reliability, safety and security, and may be achieved with fault 
prevention and removal at design and implementation phases. However, hardware 
faults, either permanent or transient ones, and residual software faults, may happen 
during system operation. Therefore, fault tolerance must be considered in system 
design, to prevent faults from becoming system failures.  
Fault tolerance always implies the use of some sort of redundancy. Hardware 
redundancy is the most used type of redundancy, but several others may be applied, 
such as software redundancy (several software versions), time redundancy (re-
execution) and information redundancy (e.g. correcting codes).  
This work provides the BOSS operating system with mechanisms for achieving fault 
tolerance at the application level, by using fault-tolerant middleware and operating 
system support. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 introduces the BOSS 
operating system and its principal features, section 3 covers the principal concepts in 
fault-tolerant strategies used by this work, section 4 describes the design and section 5 
the implementation of these strategies by the middleware, section 6 presents the test 
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configurations and results, section 7 covers the related work and section 8 concludes 
this paper. 
2 BOSS Operating System 
BOSS is a real-time embedded operating system designed for applications demanding 
high dependability [2].  Simplicity is the main strategy for achieving dependability in 
BOSS, as complexity is the cause of most development faults. The system was 
developed in C++, using an object-oriented framework simple enough to be 
understood and applied in several application domains. Although targeting minimal 
complexity, no fundamental functionality is missing, as its microkernel provides 
support for resource management, thread synchronization and communication, 
input/output and interrupts management. The system is fully preemptive and uses 
priority based scheduling and round robin for same priority threads. 
The BIRD Satellite, designed for early detection of fires, uses BOSS as the 
multicomputer control operating system. Boss has been ported to different projects 
and platforms as PowerPC, x86 and Atmel AVR. It also runs on top of Linux, mainly 
for developing and testing purposes. 
BOSS was designed to support fault tolerance in applications with hardware 
redundancy by including a middleware which carries out transparent communications 
between nodes. The messages exchange is asynchronous, using the publisher-
subscriber protocol.  Using this approach, no fix communication paths are established 
and the system can be reconfigured at run-time easily. For instance, several replicas of 
the same software can run in different nodes and publish the result using the same 
subject, without knowing of each other. A voter thread may subscribe to that subject 
and vote on the correct result, as represented in Figure 1. It is also possible to replicate 
the voter thread and even place a voter thread and a controller thread in the same 
node. All message communication between threads is taken by the middleware using a 
broadcast bus interface. 
 
 
 Figure 1: Simple Voting 
 
3 Fault Tolerance Concepts 
This work aims to extend BOSS functionality by providing support for application 
level fault tolerance using several predefined strategies, such as Recovery Blocks 
(RB)[3][4] and Distributed Recovery Blocks (DRB) [5]. These techniques make the 
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system fault-tolerant to either hardware or software faults. Regarding persistence,  
faults may be classified as permanent or transient, but transient faults are usually more 
frequent than permanent ones, especially in the space environment. 
An usual mechanism to deal with transient faults is time redundancy or the re-
execution of tasks in case of an error detection. Both RB and DRB methods allow re-
execution of tasks or blocks, and add an extra possibility: the use of a different version 
of software, or variant, as the second execution block. The main difference between 
RB and DRB is the distributed nature of the later, allowing concurrent running of 
variants in two distinct nodes and a coordination between them to define what node 
will send the final output. Also, DRB is usually limited to two software variants, while 
RB has no restriction in the number of variants. 
The use of RB or DRB implies the definition of standard application procedures, 
such as the primary and recovery variants and also procedures for saving the system 
state (checkpointing) before the first execution and restoring it in case of error, 
preparing it for running the alternate variant. Futhermore, an acceptance test (AT) 
must be defined and executed after each variant run. Figure 2 presents the basic 
algorithm used to implement the RB method with two variants only. In this method, it 
is possible to use a timer to limit the execution time of each variant, which may be 
considered as a time AT failure.   
The DRB method can be seen as two RB stations running alternate blocks. One 
computer node is called primary and the other backup or shadow. The primary node 
runs the procedure A as primary block and procedure B as the recovery one; the 
shadow node runs procedure B as primary block and procedure A as the recovery one. 
Only the primary node produces an output.  If the shadow node notes the ocurrence of 
an error in the primary node, either by an AT failure message or by a timeout, it 
assumes as primary and sends its output. DRB has a clear advantage over RB as it 
makes use of hardware redundancy besides its intrinsic time and software redundancy 
inherited from RB. 
 
Figure 2: Recovery Blocks (RB) with two variants 
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4 Fault Tolerance Design 
The main design goal is to provide the fault tolerance strategies just presented with 
minimal burden to the application level. A new middleware periodic thread had to be 
created to control and schedule all fault-tolerant (FT) threads. This thread, called 
MiddlewareScheduler (MS), runs at the beginning of every clock tick interval and 
controls the behaviour and execution of each RB or DRB thread. Besides, this thread 
is also responsible for activating other middleware threads, as the one who reads and 
delivers the new external incoming messages.  
In BOSS, each thread is an object of the Thread Class and has its own stack space 
and a control block as a data member. The run method defines the main execution 
code of the thread, and starts running when the thread is scheduled for the first time. A 
typical thread body is an infinite loop, and the thread activation is dependent either on 
message reception or on timing requirements. Figure 3 presents an example of thread 
implementation in BOSS. In this example, the Receiver thread uses an 
IncommingMessageAdministrator object for reading messages, just like in a mail box. 
If no messages are queued, the thread is suspended and becomes ready for execution 
again after a new message has arrived. Only messages with the “subject1” subject are 
delivered to that mail box by the middleware. 
 
 
class Receiver : public Thread { 
   
  IncommingMessageAdministrator<Msg, 20> inMsg; 
  Msg* recMsg; 
   
public: 
   
  void run () { 
 
    incommingMessages.listen("subject1"); 
     
    printf("Receiver will wait for 1s...\n"); 
    suspendFor(1*SECONDS); 
 
    while(1) { 
      printf("Receiver waiting...\n"); 
      recMsg = inMsg.receive(); 
 
      printf(".... Got data: %ld %ld %ld \n",  
      recMsg->a,  recMsg->b, recMsg->c); 
    } 
  } 
}; 
 
Figure 3: A BOSS thread example 
 
For the execution of a RB or DRB fault-tolerant strategy, the thread object has to 
define the implementation of the following procedures:  
- primary block; 
- recovery block; 
- save state; 
- restore state; 
- acceptance test; and 
- send result. 
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The RB strategy is limited to two variants to be fully compatible, at the application 
level, with the DRB strategy. The recovery block can be a degraded version of the full 
functionality provided by the primary block, but it must guarantee the delivering of 
acceptable results for a short period of time. If only one software variant is available, 
it is possible to define the recovery block as equal to the primary one. In that case, 
only time redundancy is achieved and the primary block will be re-executed once if an 
error is detected. 
The diagram in Figure 4 shows the interaction between the MS and RB Threads for 
the execution of the RB strategy. The operation is started by the application thread 
upon receiving an input message or after waking up at a specific time. After setting up 
a deadline for execution, based on the actual time and the maximum allowed response 
time, the thread suspends.  In subsequent MS activations, this thread verifies if the 
deadline has expired and, in that case, restarts the RB thread. This represents a failure 
in delivering the correct response on time, but after restarting, the RB thread is ready 
again for receiving the next request or activation. If the deadline has not expired, the 
MS thread commands the next actions to be performed by the RB thread and 
schedules it for execution. After executing the right operations (save/restore state, run 
primary/recovery block, run acceptance test) the RB thread suspends again and the 
MS thread checks the AT result. If the RB thread succeeds in AT, the MS thread 
allows it to send the results and the interaction finishes. If the RB thread fails in both 
blocks it is restarted by the MS thread.  
 
 
Figure 4: RB execution control 
 
 The execution of the DRB involves the coordination between two nodes for 
delivering a unique result to the system. This coordination is carried out by message 
exchanges between the middleware of both nodes, without any intervention from the 
DRB threads. The interface from the MS to DRB threads is basically the same, but the 
control algorithm at the MS thread is augmented by the state information messages 
that are exchanged with the other partner node and with the role being performed: 
Primary or Shadow. Figure 5 presents a general representation of DRB message 
exchanges. The “AT OK” message is sent by the MS thread if the primary node has 
succeeded in one of the two blocks. After sending this message, the Primary MS 
thread releases the Primary DRB thread to send its results, which could imply in 
sending an “output message” to another node. If the primary node fails in both AT or 
is unable to terminate its task before its deadline, no message is sent to the shadow 
node. In that case, the DRB primary node will be restarted and it will change its role 
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to shadow, while the shadow node will send its results just after its deadline, and it 
will assume as the primary node. Because of the communication delays involved, the 
shadow deadline should be greater than the primary one. 
   
 
Figure 5: DRB message exchange 
 
In case of failure of both primary and shadow nodes, no output will be released and 
both threads will be restarted as shadow nodes. In order to avoid this condition, an 
agreement protocol had to be established to detect role conflicts and set up alternate 
roles. This involves periodic status message exchanges between MS threads when the 
DRB execution is not active, and a conflict solution procedure based on the order of 
the node identifications. These messages are represented in Figure 5 as “Status” 
messages. 
Besides these two strategies of fault tolerance, support for the voting operation in N-
Modular Redundancy (NMR) or N-Version Programming (NVP) [6] is provided. For 
this reason, an application voter thread, like the one presented in Figure 1, will 
implement the following procedures: 
- store solution – to save a solution received by the voter; 
- find equal solution – to test if two received solution are acceptably equal; and 
- send result – to output the voted solution. 
The proposed algorithm uses single match voting. Upon receiving a solution 
message, the voter thread compares the solution with the previous ones just received 
and if one “equal” solution is found it is considered as correct and the output is 
immediately sent. In this case, further messages are discarded. If only one solution 
message arrives and the deadline occurs, this solution is also considered correct and it 
is sent as the output.  For the implementation of voting, it is required sequential 
message identification, already supported by the middleware. 
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5 Fault Tolerance Implementation 
The initial programming technique used to implement the extra functionality of FT 
threads was, as would be natural, object-oriented. Three new classes were created, 
derived from the Thread class, as shown in the UML class diagram in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Object-oriented implementation 
 
In this implementation, application threads are defined by single and direct 
inheritance of classes Thread (for non-FT threads), RBThread, DRBThread or 
VoterThread. The constructor of these classes sets the enumeration type FTType in 
class Thread accordingly. Figure 6 only presents FT attributes of the Thread class, and 
some general operations applied to the control of FT threads. Classes RBThread, 
DRBThread and VoterThread define application specific procedures as virtual 
functions and provide an empty (stub) implementation for them. For instance, the 
saveState function does nothing and the acceptanceTest function returns true. 
Therefore, FT application threads must overwrite these methods. The non-virtual 
functions of these base classes define the operation of the fault-tolerant strategy in 
coordination with the MiddlewareScheduler thread using the data members of these 
classes to exchange information. These functions have to be called properly by the 
application software. In this implementation, no polymorphism was used in order to 
avoid increasing of the Thread class’ memory footprint. 
For performance reasons, a second implementation using callback functions instead 
of virtual functions was developed. Figure 7 shows a UML diagram of the Thread 
class in this implementation.  
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Figure 7: Callback functions implementation 
 
In this implementation, FT application threads inherit directly from the Thread 
class. However, FT threads should call the function defineAsFT, passing its type and 
callback pointers for all application functions needed, also including a callback for the 
function which runs the fault-tolerant strategy itself. The static functions executeRB, 
executeDRB and executeVOTER are provided in the Thread class as default 
implementations for the FT strategies. The structure called FTStragegyCtrl_t keeps 
the data needed for information exchange between the MiddlewareScheduler and the 
threads. Stub implementations are provided for application dependent functions, but 
these are not shown in Figure 7.  
  Besides its better performance, because it avoids one extra level of indirection in 
dispatching a virtual function, this implementation allows changing the type of a FT 
thread at run-time, as long as the definition of all application specific and strategy 
specific functions. 
6 Results 
Coding and testing was carried out in the Linux environment, using an on-top-of 
Linux implementation of BOSS. In this configuration, BOSS kernel and the 
application itself were compiled into a single executable and run as a Linux process. 
The BOSS runs in Linux FIFO scheduling with the maximum priority. Two Pentium 
computers, connected by an Ethernet network, were used. The MiddlewareScheduler 
thread activation period was set to 1 ms and network incoming messages were 
delivered each 2 ms. Communication was implemented using UDP sockets and 
broadcast.  
A sorting application was developed, using different sorting algorithms as variants: 
Bubble Sort, Insertion Sort and Selection Sort. A random array of 2000 integer 
elements was generated and published by a Sender thread under the subject 
“unsorted”. Figure 8 shows the testing configuration for Recovery Blocks. In this 
configuration, two Receiver threads run on separate nodes as RB threads. The primary 
and recovery blocks use two of the three sorting algorithms. The operation of the two 
RB threads is totally independent and each one publishes its results under the “sorted” 
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subject. The Actuator thread subscribes the sorted messages and displays the first 10 
elements for checking. Faulty conditions in the Receiver thread were generated by 
introducing a failure result in the acceptance test function at compile-time, in one or 
both blocks. 
 
Figure 8: RB testing 
 
Figure 9 shows the configuration and message exchanges in DRB testing.  As it can 
be noted, only the primary Receiver thread sends its output to the Actuator threads.  
 
 
Figure 9: DRB testing 
 
Finally, Figure 10 shows the configuration and message exchanges in the Voter 
thread testing running a NVP strategy with three variants.  Fautly conditions were 
generated by introducing unsorted integer values after sorting in each variant, at 
compile time.  
 
 
Figure 10: Voter testing 
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No problems were detected in these configurations. The system results were 
checked by logging all messages and the principal function events, including timing 
information. The expected behaviour was observed at all times.    
7 Related Work 
Several patterns and frameworks for fault tolerance design using object-oriented 
approaches have been proposed in the last ten years [7][8][9][10]. In all them, 
concepts as checkpointing, try-blocks, acceptance tests, versions and voters are 
represented by classes. Each proposal has its own class structure, using abstract 
classes to represent more general constructs as variants and abjudicators. Some 
common patterns are used in these frameworks, like the composite pattern[11] as in 
[9] and [10].  In general, these proposals do not address thread models and distributed 
architectures.  
Few implementations of fault tolerance support by the operating system or by a 
middleware were found. 
FT-RT-Mach, an academic general purpose operating systems, and the DEOS 
operating system, a certified operating system for critical avionics applications, use 
re-execution of tasks as the primary method for achieving fault tolerance[12]. In these 
systems, an error can be detected either by an acceptance test or any other exception, 
and the operating system scheduler tries to guarantee the re-scheduling of the thread 
before its deadline. This requires that Rate Monotonic Scheduling and Admission 
Control of threads are performed by both operating systems. In FT-RT-Mach, the 
checkpointing of state information and its restoration, in case of error, are 
implemented at the application level, while DEOS implements this capability at the 
operating system level.   
ROAFTS (Real-Time Object-Oriented Adaptive Fault Tolerant Support) is a 
middleware architecture developed by University of California [13]. It was designed 
to run over commercial operating systems as UNIX and Windows NT. The 
middleware can support several strategies of fault tolerance, like RB and DRB, and 
dynamically switches the units operating mode in response to changes in the resource 
and application modes. This middleware is applied as a component of the TMO 
(Time-triggered Message-triggered Object structuring scheme) model of computation 
[14] where the basic units of computation are time-triggered and service methods of 
real-time distributed objects. When one of these methods is called, the local scheduler 
assigns a thread to run its computation and schedules it based on its deadline. The 
system requires a supervisor unit to help detect failures in the working nodes and 
clock synchronization between nodes. 
Despite having the same goal of this work, the systems described target large-scale 
critical systems, and do not fit into embedded systems applications because of its 
intense resource utilization and complexity. 
8 Conclusion and Future Work  
We proposed a design and implementation of fault tolerance support mechanisms for 
the BOSS embedded real-time operating system using modern object-oriented 
concepts and middleware technology. The main goal of the project was adding fault 
tolerance functionality with minimum complexity and resource commitment, which is 
a requirement for high-dependable embedded systems. 
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Future work will include: 
- Implement a schedule policy for fault-tolerant threads, based on its deadlines. 
- Establish a protocol for defining a primary voter between many voter threads. 
This would be useful if only one node must perform an output.  
- Execute more rigorous testing using multicomputer/network hardware 
simulators and also using several microprocessor boards and a real-time control 
application.  
- Develop an aspect-oriented version of the BOSS operating system, including FT 
support as aspects. Similar versions for logging and thread synchronization have 
already been developed. Initially static weaving will be used, but experiments 
with dynamic weaving are planned.  
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